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Abstract. As formalized by Kiltz et al. (ICALP ’05), append-only signatures (AOS) are digital sig-
nature schemes where anyone can publicly append extra message blocks to an already signed sequence
of messages. This property is useful, e.g., in secure routing, in collecting response lists, reputation
lists, or petitions. Bethencourt, Boneh and Waters (NDSS ’07) suggested an interesting variant, called
history-hiding append-only signatures (HH-AOS), which handles messages as sets rather than ordered
tuples. This HH-AOS primitive is useful when the exact order of signing needs to be hidden. When free
of subliminal channels (i.e., channels that can tag elements in an undetectable fashion), it also finds
applications in the storage of ballots on an electronic voting terminals or in other archival applications
(such as the record of petitions, where we want to hide the influence among messages). However, the
only subliminal-free HH-AOS to date only provides heuristic arguments in terms of security: Only a
proof in the idealized (non-realizable) random oracle model is given. This paper provides the first HH-
AOS construction secure in the standard model. Like the system of Bethencourt et al., our HH-AOS
features constant-size public keys, no matter how long messages to be signed are, which is atypical (we
note that secure constructions often suffer from a space penalty when compared to their random-oracle-
based counterpart). As a second result, we show that, even if we use it to sign ordered vectors as in an
ordinary AOS (which is always possible with HH-AOS), our system provides considerable advantages
over existing realizations. As a third result, we show that HH-AOS schemes provide improved identity-
based ring signatures (i.e., in prime order groups and with a better efficiency than the state-of-the-art
schemes).
Keywords: Homomorphic signatures, provable security, privacy, unlinkability, standard model, super-
set predicates, archive integrity.
1 Introduction
Append-only signatures (AOS), as introduced by Kiltz, Mityagin, Panjwani and Raghavan [37],
are signature schemes where, given a signature on a multi-block message (M1, . . . ,Mn), anyone
can publicly compute a signature on the message (M1, . . . ,Mn,Mn+1), for any Mn+1. Kiltz et al.
provided both generic constructions, based on any signature scheme, and concrete constructions
based on specific assumptions. They further proved that AOS are equivalent to hierarchical identity-
based signatures [46, 30]. Importantly, the schemes of [37] are inherently history-preserving in that
signed messages are ordered tuples.
In [14], Bethencourt, Boneh and Waters (BBW) noted that certain important applications of
incremental signature nature require, in fact, a kind of AOS system that allows authenticating sets
(i.e., without divulging any order among elements) rather than ordered tuples. They suggested a
primitive, called History-Hiding Append-Only Signatures (HH-AOS) that can be seen as a special
case of homomorphic signatures. It allows one to sign a set of messages in such a way that anyone
can subsequently derive a signature on arbitrary supersets of the initial set. Bethencourt et al.
used this primitive to design tamper-evident, history-hiding and subliminal-free mechanisms (by
extending techniques due to Molnar et al. [41]) for storing ballots on e-voting terminals. To prevent
anyone from injecting subliminal information (e.g., by embedding some information in derived
signatures), it is required that derived signatures be indistinguishable from original ones on the
resulting superset. Independently, Moran, Naor and Segev [42] addressed the same problem using
write-once memories rather than digital signatures. They described a deterministic vote-storage
mechanism without relying on cryptographic techniques. Their solution fits within a line of work,
initiated by Micciancio [40], on history-hiding data structures [40, 43], which recently has been
extended to applied systems [8]. While secure against unbounded adversaries, the Moran et al.
technique [42] is significantly more memory-demanding than [14] and this overhead was proved
inherent to deterministic techniques [42]. The HH-AOS approach of Bethencourt et al. [14] thus
appears to remain the most promising method to reliably store n elements in a history-hiding,
tamper-evident and scalable manner, namely, using only O(n) memory.
It is worth noting that HH-AOS are a more powerful primitive than ordinary AOS: any HH-AOS
can immediately be turned —by means of a hash-based order-embedding transformation— into an
equally efficient regular append-only signature. HH-AOS schemes are thus more versatile as they
can also be used in all the applications which append-only signatures were initially designed for.
Related Work. Homomorphic signatures were first suggested by Desmedt [24] as a new concept
useful in the validation of computer operation. Johnson et al. [36] provided security definitions and
examples of set homomorphic signatures. Several such constructions in [36, 5, 6] allow for subset
derivation (i.e., a signature on a set allows deriving a signature on arbitrary subsets of that set) but
none of these works considers the dual superset homomorphism case. The latter was investigated
for the first time by Bethencourt et al. [14] who provided two HH-AOS realizations which both
have some limitations pointed at by the original authors (in essence, demonstrating the associated
difficulties with such a scheme). The first one is a generic construction, based on any signature,
where the public key has linear size in the maximal size of sets to be signed. As a consequence,
this construction requires the signer to determine an upper bound on the cardinality of sets when
generating a key pair. Moreover, this generic construction is not free of subliminal channels. The
reason is that it allows the party running the signature derivation algorithm to choose certain
values pseudo-randomly (rather than truly randomly), which allows a distinguisher to infer some
information on the derivation history of signatures.
The second construction of [14] is a subliminal-free system built upon the aggregate signature
scheme of Boneh et al. [20]. It eliminates the disadvantages of the first scheme in that it provides
constant-size public keys and removes the need for an a priori bound on the cardinality of authen-
ticated sets. However, while practical, this second scheme is only shown secure in the random oracle
model [11]. Recall that it is widely accepted that the random oracle methodology, while better than
providing no proof whatsoever, is an idealization that may have no standard model instantiation.
Indeed, at times, it is provably unrealizable, as was shown by a number of works (e.g., [21]).
So far, the only apparent way to build a HH-AOS system in the standard model —let alone
with constant-size public keys— is to take advantage of aggregate signatures [34, 35] in order to
instantiate the BBW system system [14] outside the random oracle idealization. (As explained in
Appendix C, sequential aggregate signatures like [39] do not suffice for this.) This requires standard
model instantiations [25, 35] of Full Domain Hash [12]. As of now, this is only known under the
recent “multi-linear maps” [27], which still have no practical realizations and serve as polynomial
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plausibility only. Even the recent results of Hohenberger et al. [35] rely on indistinguishability
obfuscation [28], known to exist from multi-linear maps only. Thus, such possible ideas cannot yield
practical schemes based on simple standard assumptions (like Diffie-Hellman or Decision Linear
[16]). In addition, multi-linear maps are quite new, and the state of their secure implementation
remains unclear.
Our Contribution. We describe the first efficient history-hiding append-only signature with
constant-size public keys in the standard model (by “constant” we mean that it only depends on
the security parameter, and not on the cardinality of sets to be signed). This new scheme further
provides perfectly re-randomizable signatures, which guarantees the absence of subliminal channels.
Our scheme also provably satisfies a definition of unlinkability stronger than that of [14]. We
actually re-cast the syntax of HH-AOS schemes in the definitional framework of Ahn et al. [5] for
homomorphic signatures. The privacy notion of [5] mandates that derived signatures be statistically
indistinguishable from original signatures, even when these are given to the distinguisher. In [6],
Attrapadung et al. further strengthened the latter privacy notion by considering all valid-looking
original signatures and not only those in the range of the signing algorithm.
Our construction is asymptotically as efficient as the original BBW realization. Even if we ignore
its history-hiding property, it favorably compares to existing append-only signatures [37] in that it
appears to be the only known AOS realization that simultaneously provides the following properties:
(i) full security (i.e., unforgeability in a model where the adversary can adaptively choose its target
message); (ii) constant-size public keys; and (iii) privacy in the sense of the strongest definition
considered in [6]. In comparison, the certificate-based generic AOS scheme of [37] is easily seen not
to reach the latter level of privacy. As for other fully secure constructions with short public keys,
they are all obtained by applying the Naor transformation [17] to unbounded hierarchical identity-
based encryption systems [38], which build on Waters’ dual system encryption technique [48]. Since
the latter always involves at least two distinct distributions of valid signatures (or private keys), it
seems inherently incompatible with the information-theoretic privacy notion used in [6].
Our scheme is motivated by ideas that were used in [6] to construct a subset homomorphic
signature (namely, a signature on a set authenticates the entire powerset of that set). These ideas,
in turn, are augmented by other novel techniques and ideas. Like [6], we rely on the randomiz-
ability of Groth-Sahai proofs [32] to render signatures perfectly randomizable. However, superset
predicates seem harder to handle than their subset counterpart. Indeed, if we disregard privacy
properties, simple constructions5 readily solve the subset case whereas no such thing is known to
work for superset predicates, even when privacy is not a concern. Like [6], our approach proceeds by
generating a fresh ephemeral public key X = gx for each set to be signed. The underlying private
key is split into n additive shares {ωi}ni=1 such that x =
∑n
i=1 ωi, where n is the cardinality of the
set. Each of these is then used to sign a set element mi in the fashion of Boneh-Lynn-Shacham
[19] signatures, by computing HG(mi)
ωi using a number theoretic hash function HG : {0, 1}L → G.
Although BLS signatures are only known to be secure in the random oracle model (at least in their
original form), we, in contrast, can prove the security of the scheme in the standard model as long
as HG is programmable [33] in the same way as the hash function used in [47]. At the same time,
we depart from the security proof of [47] in that the programmability of HG is used in a different
way which is closer to the security proofs of Hofheinz and Kiltz [33]. Recall that programmable
5 For example, as mentioned in [6, Section 5], one can merely sign each set using a new ephemeral public key that
is certified by the long-term key.
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hash functions [33] are number theoretic hash functions where the hash value HG(m) is linked to
its representation gamhbm for given base elements g, h ∈ G. While security proofs in the standard
model often require logg(HG(m)) to be available in the forgery message and unavailable in signed
messages, we proceed the other way around: at some crucial signing query Msg = {m1, . . . ,mn},
we require HG(m) not to depend on h for exactly one set element mi ∈ Msg.
Relation to Identity-Based Ring Signatures. Ring signatures, as introduced by Rivest,
Shamir and Tauman [44] allow users to anonymously sign messages on behalf of any ad hoc set of
users that includes them. Their typical application is to allow a source to anonymously reveal a
sensitive information while providing guarantees of trustworthiness.
While ring signatures are known from 2001, rigorous security definitions remained lacking until
the work of Bender et al. [13] and efficient constructions in the standard model were only given by
Shacham and Waters [45] and by Chandran et al. [22]. In the identity-based setting, constructing
ring signatures remains a non-trivial problem as generic constructions from ordinary ring signatures
do not appear to work.
Identity-based ring signatures are extensions of ring signatures [44] to the identity-based setting
[46]. They are signature schemes wherein users can employ a private key derived from their identity
to sign messages on behalf of any set of identities that includes theirs. The verifier is convinced that
a signature was created by a ring member but does not learn anything else. Recently, Au et al. [7]
described a fully secure identity-based ring signature in the standard model using composite order
groups. Their scheme seems amenable for constructing a HH-AOS system. However, due to the use
of the dual system technique [29], it cannot achieve the same level of privacy as our scheme (as we
discuss later on). Interestingly, any HH-AOS scheme, in fact, gives an identity-based ring signature
as the private key of some identity id can consist of a HH-AOS signature on the singleton {0‖id}
which allows the derivation of a signature on the set {0‖id, 0‖id1, . . . , 0‖idn, 1‖M‖R}, where M is
the message and R = {id, id1, . . . , idn} is the ring. As detailed in Section 4, we obtain fully secure
identity-based ring signatures based on simple assumptions in prime order groups, which allow for
a much better efficiency and a stronger flavor of anonymity than [7].
2 Background
2.1 Definitions for History-Hiding Append-Only Signatures
We first recall the original syntactic definition of history-hiding append-only signatures.
Definition 1 ([14]). An History-Hiding Append-Only Signatures (HH-AOS) is a tuple of
algorithms (Keygen,Append,Verify) with the following specifications.
Keygen(λ): takes as input a security parameter λ ∈ N and outputs a public key PK and a private
key SK = Φ which consists of an initial signature Φ on the empty set ∅.
Append(PK,Φ, S,m): given a public key PK, a signature Φ for some set S and a message
m ∈ {0, 1}∗, this algorithm outputs ⊥ if Φ is not a valid signature on the set S or if m ∈ S.
Otherwise, it outputs a signature Φ′ on the augmented set S′ = S ∪ {m}.
Verify(PK,S, Φ): given a public key PK, and a presented signature Φ for a given set S, this
algorithm outputs 1 if Φ is a valid signature for S and 0 otherwise.
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Correctness. For any integers λ ∈ N and n ∈ poly(λ), all key pairs (PK,SK) ← Keygen(λ)
and all sets S = {m1, . . . ,mn}, if Φ0 = SK, S0 = ∅ and Φi ← Append(PK,Φi−1, Si,mi), where
Si = Si−1 ∪ {mi}, for i = 1 to n, then Verify(PK,S, Φn) = 1.
Bethencourt et al. [14] define two security properties of HH-AOS schemes which are called
append-only unforgeability and history-hiding. These properties can be defined as follows.
Definition 2. A HH-AOS scheme (Keygen,Append,Verify) is append-only unforgeable if no
PPT adversary has non-negligible advantage in the following game:
1. The challenger generates a key pair (PK,SK) ← Keygen(λ) and hands PK to the adversary
A.
2. On polynomially occasions, the adversary A chooses a set S = {m1, . . . ,mn}, for some arbitrary
n ∈ poly(λ). We assume w.l.o.g. that m1, . . . ,mn are sorted in lexicographical order. For i = 1
to n, the challenger computes Φi ← Append(PK,Φi−1, Si−1,mi), where Si = Si−1 ∪ {mi} for
each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and with S0 = ∅, Φ0 = SK. Then, Φn is returned to A.
3. A outputs a pair (S?, Φ?) and wins if: (i) Verify(PK,S?, Φ?) = 1; (ii) If S1, . . . , Sq denote the
sets for which A obtained signatures at Step 2, then Si 6⊆ S? for each i ∈ {1, . . . , q}. The
adversary’s advantage is its probability of success, taken over all coin tosses.
Definition 3. A HH-AOS scheme (Keygen,Append,Verify) is history-hiding if no PPT adversary
has non-negligible advantage in the following game:
1. The challenger generates a key pair (PK,SK)← Keygen(λ) and gives PK to the adversary A.
2. The adversary A chooses a set S = {m1, . . . ,mn}, for some n ∈ poly(λ), and two distinct
permutations pi0, pi1 : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n}. The challenger chooses a random bit b R← {0, 1}
and defines m′i = pib(mi) for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. It computes Φi ← Append(PK,Φi−1, Si−1,m′i),
where Si = Si−1 ∪ {m′i} for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and with S0 = ∅, Φ0 = SK. It returns Φn to A.
3. A outputs a bit b′ ∈ {0, 1} and wins if b′ = b. The adversary’s advantage is the distance
Adv(A) := |Pr[b′ = b]− 1/2|.
While the above definition is sufficient for applications like vote storage [14], it can be strength-
ened in a number of ways. For example, the adversary could be granted access to a signing oracle
before and after Step 2. Alternatively, the adversary could be given the private key SK at Step 1
of the game. Finally, we may also ask for security in the statistical (rather than computational)
sense.
These stronger security properties will be naturally obtained by viewing HH-AOS schemes as a
particular case of homomorphic signatures in the sense of the definitions of [5, 6].
2.2 Definitions for Homomorphic Signatures
Definition 4 ([5]). Let M be a message space and 2M be its powerset. Let P : 2M ×M→ {0, 1}
be a predicate. A message m′ is said derivable from M ⊂M if P (M,m′) = 1. As in [5], P i(M) is
defined as the set of messages derivable from P i−1(M), where P 0(M) := {m′ ∈M | P (M,m′) = 1}.
Finally, P ∗(M) := ∪∞i=0P i(M) denotes the set of messages iteratively derivable from M .
Definition 5 ([5]). A P-homomorphic signature for a predicate P : 2M×M→ {0, 1} consists
of a triple of algorithms (Keygen, SignDerive,Verify) such that:
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Keygen(λ): takes in a security parameter λ ∈ N and outputs a key pair (sk, pk). As in [5], the
private key sk is a signature on the empty tuple ε ∈M.
SignDerive
(
pk, ({σm}m∈M ,M),m′
)
: is a possibly probabilistic algorithm that inputs a public
key pk, a set of messages M ⊂ M, a corresponding set of signatures {σm}m∈M and a derived
message m′ ∈M. If P (M,m′) = 0, it outputs ⊥. Otherwise, it outputs a derived signature σ′.
Verify(pk,m, σ): is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a public key pk, a signature σ
and a message m. It outputs 0 or 1.
The empty tuple ε ∈ M satisfies P (ε,m) = 1 for each message m ∈ M. Similarly to Ahn et al.
[5], we define Sign(pk, sk,m) as the algorithm that runs6 SignDerive(pk, (sk, ε),m) and outputs the
result. For any M = {m1, . . . ,mk} ⊂ M, we let Sign(sk,M) := {Sign(sk,m1), . . . ,Sign(sk,mk)} .
Finally, we write Verify(pk,M, {σm}m∈M ) = 1 to say that Verify(pk,m, σm) = 1 for each m ∈M .
Correctness. For all key pairs (pk, sk)← Keygen(λ), for any message set M ⊂M and any single
message m′ ∈M such that P (M,m′) = 1, the following conditions have to be satisfied:
(i) SignDerive(pk, (Sign(sk,M),M),m′) 6=⊥;
(ii) Verify
(
pk,m′,SignDerive(pk, (Sign(sk,M),M),m′)
)
= 1.
Definition 6 ([5]). A P -homomorphic signature scheme is unforgeable if no PPT adversary has
noticeable advantage in the game below:
1. The challenger generates a key pair (pk, sk) ← Keygen(λ) and gives pk to the adversary A. It
initializes two initially empty tables T and Q.
2. A adaptively interleaves the following queries.
– Signing queries: A chooses a message m ∈ M. The challenger replies by choosing a handle
h, runs σ ← Sign(sk,m) and stores (h,m, σ) in a table T . The handle h is returned to A.
– Derivation queries: A chooses a vector of handles ~h = (h1, . . . , hk) and a message m′ ∈ M.
The challenger first retrieves the tuples {(hi,mi, σi)}ki=1 from the table T and returns ⊥ if one
of them is missing. Otherwise, it defines M := (m1, . . . ,mk) and {σm}m∈M = {σ1, . . . , σk}.
If P (M,m′) = 1, the challenger runs σ′ ← SignDerive(pk, ({σm}m∈M ,M),m′), chooses a
handle h′, stores (h′,m′, σ′) in T and returns h′ to A.
– Reveal queries: A chooses a handle h. If no entry of the form (h,m′, σ′) exists in T , the
challenger returns ⊥. Otherwise, it returns σ′ to A and adds (m′, σ′) to the set Q.
3. The adversary A outputs a pair (σ′,m′) and wins if: (i) Verify(pk,m′, σ′) = 1; (ii) If M ⊂ M
is the set of messages in Q, then m′ 6∈ P ∗(M).
Ahn et al. [5] considered a strong notion of unconditional privacy that requires the inability of
distinguishing derived signatures from original ones, even when these are given along with the
private key. In [5], it was showed that, if a scheme is strongly context hiding, then Definition 6 can
be simplified by only providing the adversary with an ordinary signing oracle.
As noted in [6], specific applications may require an even stronger definition. The following
definition makes sense when homomorphic signatures are randomizable and/or the verifier accepts
several distributions of valid signatures.
6 The intuition here is that any message can be derived when the original signature contains the signing key.
6
Definition 7 ([6]). An homomorphic signature (Keygen, Sign, SignDerive,Verify) is completely
context hiding for the predicate P if, for all key pairs (pk, sk)← Keygen(λ), for all message sets
M ⊂M∗ and all messages m′ ∈M such that P (M,m′) = 1, for all signatures {σm}m∈M such that
Verify(pk,M, {σm}m∈M ) = 1, the distribution
{
(sk, {σm}m∈M , Sign(sk,m′))
}
sk,M,m′ is statistically
close to the distribution of
{(
sk, {σm}m∈M ,SignDerive
(
pk, ({σm}m∈M ,M),m′
))}
sk,M,m′.
We will be interested in HH-AOS systems, which can be seen as P -homomorphic signatures
for superset predicates: namely, for any two messages Msg1,Msg2 ∈ M, we have P (Msg1,Msg2) =
1 ⇐⇒ Msg1 ⊆ Msg2. Note that a completely context-hiding homomorphic signature for superset
predicates immediately implies a HH-AOS scheme satisfying a stronger privacy property than
Definition 3.
In particular, our construction immediately implies an ordinary (i.e., non-history-hiding) AOS
scheme that allows signing ordered tuples while enjoying a stronger form of privacy than in [37]. For
example, if we consider the generic AOS [37], which builds on any digital signature, a signature on
a vector (m1, . . . ,mn) is a sequence (σ0, pk1, . . . , σn, pkn, skn) where σi = Sign(ski, (mi+1‖pki+1))
for each i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}, {pki}ni=1 are fresh public keys generated by the signing algorithm and
(pk0, sk0) is the long term key pair of the scheme. This construction is clearly not completely
context-hiding because auxiliary public keys {pki}ni=1 appear in an original signature and all its
derivatives.
Non-generic AOS schemes can be derived from specific HIBE schemes like the one of Boneh,
Boyen and Goh [15] but, in the standard model, the public parameters have length linear in the
maximal length of signed messages. For the time being, the only known way to construct a fully
secure AOS without having to fix a pre-determined maximal message length is to apply Naor’s
IBE-to-signature transformation [17] to an unbounded HIBE scheme [38]. Unfortunately, the se-
curity proof will probably rely on the dual system technique [48] (see also [29]) which is hardly
compatible with the privacy notion of Definition 7. The reason is that this technique involves sev-
eral computationally indistinguishable classes of signatures satisfying the same equations although
they have different distributions. The difficulty is that there is usually no way to publicly modify
the class that a given signature belongs to, so that a signature and its derivatives must be of the
same class. Hence, for any original signatures {σm}m∈M outside the range of Sign(sk, .), Definition
7 cannot be satisfied.
In contrast, using any completely context-hiding HH-AOS, we can obtain —seemingly for the
first time— a completely context-hiding AOS scheme in the sense of Definition 7, which hides all
information about the derivation history of a signature on an ordered tuple. The construction is
detailed in Appendix E.
2.3 Programmable Hash Functions
A group hash function H = (PHF.Gen,PHF.Eval) is a pair of algorithms such that, for a security
parameter λ ∈ N, a key κ ← PHF.Gen(λ) is generated by the key generation algorithm. This key
is used to evaluate the deterministic evaluation algorithm that, on input of a string X ∈ {0, 1}L,
computes a hash value Hκ,G(X) = PHF.Eval(κ,X) ∈ G, where G is a cyclic abelian group.
Definition 8 ([33]). A group hash function HG : {0, 1}∗ → G is (m,n, γ, δ)-programmable if
there exist PPT algorithms (PHF.TrapGen,PHF.TrapEval) such that:
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– For generators g, h ∈ G, the trapdoor key generation algorithm (κ′, tk)← PHF.TrapGen(λ, g, h)
outputs a key κ′ and a trapdoor tk such that, for any X ∈ {0, 1}L, (aX , bX)← PHF.TrapEval(tk,X)
produces integers aX , bX such that Hκ′,G(X) = PHF.Eval(κ
′, X) = gaXhbX .
– For all g, h ∈ G and for κ← PHF.Gen(λ), (κ′, tk)← PHF.TrapGen(λ, g, h), the distributions of
κ and κ′ are statistically γ-close to each other.
– For all g, h ∈ G and all keys κ′ produced by PHF.TrapGen, for all X1, . . . , Xm ∈ {0, 1}L,
Z1, . . . , Zn ∈ {0, 1}L such that Xi 6= Zj, the corresponding (aXi , bXi) ← PHF.TrapEval(tk,Xi)
and (aZi , bZi)← PHF.TrapEval(tk, Zi) are such that
Pr[bX1 = · · · = bXm = 0 ∧ bZ1 , . . . , bZn 6= 0] ≥ δ ,
where the probability is taken over the trapdoor tk produced along with κ′.
The hash function of [47] hashes L-bit strings M = m1 · · ·mL ∈ {0, 1}L by mapping them to
Hκ,G(M) = h0 ·
∏L
i=1 h
mi
i using public group elements (h0, . . . , hL). This function is known [47] to
be a (1, n, 0, δ)-programmable hash function where δ = 1/(8n(L+ 1)), for any polynomial n. Using
a different technique, Hofheinz and Kiltz [33] increased the probability δ to O(1/(n
√
L)).
2.4 Hardness Assumption
We consider bilinear maps e : G × G → GT over groups of prime order p. In these groups, we
assume the intractability of the following problem.
Definition 9 ([16]). The Decision Linear Problem (DLIN) in a group G of prime order p is,
given (ga, gb, gac, gbd, η), with a, b, c, d
R← Zp, to decide if η = gc+d or η ∈R G.
2.5 Structure-Preserving Signatures Secure Against Random Message Attacks
Structure-preserving signatures [1, 2] (SPS) are signature schemes where messages, signatures and
public keys all consist of elements of an abelian group over which a bilinear map is efficiently com-
putable. In addition, the verification algorithm proceeds by testing the validity of pairing product
equations (as defined in Appendix A).
We use structure-preserving signatures satisfying a relaxed security notion, where the adversary
obtains signatures on messages it has no control on. In the following syntax, a structure-preserving
signature is a tuple of efficient algorithms (Setup,Keygen, Sign,Verify) where, on input of a security
parameter, Setup produces common public parameters gk (which typically specify the chosen bi-
linear groups) to be used by all other algorithms. As for algorithms Keygen, Sign and Verify, they
operate as in an ordinary digital signatures.
In our construction, we need an SPS scheme that satisfies a notion of extended random-message
security defined by Abe et al. [3]. In the definition hereunder, M denotes an efficient message
sampler that takes as input common public parameters gk and outputs a message m as well as the
random coins τ used to sample it. In short, the definition requires the scheme to remain unforgeable
even if the adversary obtains the random coins of M.
Definition 10 ([3]). A signature scheme (Setup,Keygen, Sign,Verify) provides extended random-
message security (or XRMA security) with respect to a message sampler M if, for any PPT ad-
versary A and any polynomial q ∈ poly(λ), the adversary’s advantage is negligible in the following
game.
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1. The challenger runs gk ← Setup(λ) and (pk, sk) ← Keygen(gk). For j = 1 to q, the chal-
lenger runs (mj , τj) ← M(gk) and computes σj ← Sign(gk, sk,mj). The adversary is given
(gk, pk, {(mj , τj , σj)}qj=1)
2. The adversary A outputs a pair (m?, σ?). It is declared successful if Verify(gk, pk,m?, σ?) = 1
and m? /∈ {m1, . . . ,mq}. As usual, A’s advantage is its probability of success taken over all coin
tosses.
As in [3], we will need an XRMA-secure SPS scheme where τ contains the discrete logarithms
of the group elements that m is made of.
3 An Efficient HH-AOS Scheme
The scheme’s design is motivated by [6] to construct a homomorphic subset signature, which is
exactly the dual primitive of HH-AOS. Like the ring signature of [7], the scheme is also inspired
by the Lewko-Waters unbounded HIBE system [38] in that the signature derivation algorithm
implicitly transforms an n-out-of-n additive secret sharing into a (n + 1)-out-of-(n + 1) additive
sharing of the same secret. This transformation actually takes place in the exponent as the shares
themselves are not directly available to the derivation algorithm. Lewko and Waters [38] used a
similar technique in the key delegation algorithm of their HIBE scheme. However, we depart from
[38] in that the construction relies on the partitioning paradigm (i.e., the reduction is unable to
sign certain messages that are used to solve a hard problem in the reduction) rather than the dual
system approach. The reason is that, as pointed out in [6], the latter makes it harder to construct
completely context-hiding schemes.
The construction relies on the properties of the hash function of [47]. A programmable hash
function [33] maps a messagem to a group element so that the discrete logarithm ofHG(m) ∈ Gmay
be available with some probabilities. The hash function of [47] maps a L-bit string m ∈ {0, 1}L
to the group element HG(m) = h0 ·
∏L
i=1 h
m[i]
i , for uniformly distributed public group elements
(h0, . . . , hL) ∈R GL+1. For any m ∈ {0, 1}L, it is possible to relate HG(m) to exponents am, bm ∈ Zp
such that HG(m) = g
amhbm . As defined in [33], a (m,n)-programmable hash function is a hash
function such that, for all X1, . . . , Xm ∈ {0, 1}L, Z1, . . . , Zn ∈ {0, 1}L with Xi 6= Zj , the probability
that
∧m
i=1 bXi = 0 and
∧n
j=1 bZj 6= 0 is non-negligible.
It is known [47] that Waters’ hash function is (1, q)-programmable with probability 1/8q(L+1).
If this hash function is used to instantiate the Boneh et al. signatures [19] (for which a signature
on m consists of HG(m)
sk, where sk is the private key), this allows proving its one-time security
(i.e., its security in a game where the adversary is only allowed one signing query) in the standard
model: the adversary’s unique signing query m is answered by computing HG(m)
sk = (gsk)am from
the public key gsk if bm = 0. If the adversary forges a signature on m
? such that bm? 6= 0, the
reduction can extract hsk and solve a Diffie-Hellman instance.
Our idea is to sign a set Msg = {mi}ni=1 by generating a fresh one-time key pair (x, gx) ∈ Zp×G
for a BLS-type signature. The one-time public key X = gx is certified using the long-term key of a
structure-preserving signature. Finally, Msg = {mi}ni=1 is signed by picking ω1, . . . , ωn R← Zp such
that
∑n
i=1 ωi = x and generating pairs (σi,1, σi,2) = (HG(mi)
ωi , gωi), so that the verifier can check
that
∏n
i=1 σi,2 = X and e(σi,1, g) = e(HG(mi), σi,2) for each i. This allows anyone to publicly add
new elements to the set by transforming the sharing {ωi}ni=1 into a new sharing {ω′i}n+1i=1 of the
same value. At the same time, it will be infeasible to publicly remove elements from the signed set.
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To guarantee the full context-hiding security, we refrain from letting (σi,1, σi,2) appear in clear
and replace them by perfectly-hiding Groth-Sahai commitments to (σi,1, σi,2) along with NIWI
randomizable proofs (which are recalled Appendix A) showing that committed values satisfy the
appropriate relations.
In the notations hereunder, for any h ∈ G and any vector of group elements ~g = (g1, g2, g3) ∈ G3,
the vector
(
e(h, g1), e(h, g2), e(h, g3)
) ∈ G3T is denoted by E(h,~g).
Keygen(λ):
1. Choose a SPS scheme ΠSPS = (Setup,Keygen,Sign,Verify) allowing to sign messages consist-
ing of a single group element. We denote by `sps and vsps the number of group elements per
signature and the number of verification equations, respectively, in this scheme. Generate
common parameter gk ← ΠSPS.Setup(λ) and a key pair (sksps, pksps) ← ΠSPS.Keygen(gk)
for this scheme. We assume that gk includes the description of bilinear groups (G,GT ) or
prime order p > 2λ with a generator g ∈R G.
2. Generate a Groth-Sahai CRS f = (~f1, ~f2, ~f3) for the perfect witness indistinguishability
setting. Namely, choose ~f1 = (f1, 1, g), ~f2 = (1, f2, g), and ~f3 = ~f1
ξ1 · ~f2ξ2 · (1, 1, g)−1, with
f1, f2
R← G, ξ1, ξ2 R← Zp.
3. Choose a vector (h0, h1, . . . , hL)
R← GL+1 which defines the function HG : {0, 1}L → G that
maps any m ∈ {0, 1}L to HG(m) = h0 ·
∏L
i=1 h
m[i]
i .
The public key is defined to be pk :=
(
gk, f , pksps, {hi}Li=0
)
and the private key is sk := sksps.
The public key defines Σ = {0, 1}L.
Sign(sk,Msg): on input of a message Msg = {mi}ni=1, where mi ∈ {0, 1}L for each i, and the
private key sk = sksps, do the following.
1. Generate a one-time public key X = gx, with x
R← Zp, and a Groth-Sahai commitment
~CX = (1, 1, X) · ~f1rX · ~f2sX · ~f3tX , with rX , sX , tX R← Zp.
2. Generate a structure-preserving signature (θ1, . . . , θ`sps) ∈ G`sps on the group element X ∈
G. Then, for each j ∈ {1, . . . , `sps}, generate commitments ~Cθj = (1, 1, θj) · ~f1
rθj · ~f2sθj · ~f3tθj .
Finally, generate NIWI arguments {~pisps,j}vspsj=1 showing that committed variables (X, {θj}
`sps
j=1)
satisfy the verification equations of the structure-preserving signature.
3. Choose ω1, . . . , ωn
R← Zp subject to the constraint
∑n
i=1 ωi = x. Then, for i = 1 to n, com-
pute (σi,1, σi,2) =
(
HG(mi)
ωi , gωi
)
, where the messages are indexed in some pre-determined
lexicographical order.7 Then, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, compute Groth-Sahai commitments
~Cσi,1 = (1, 1, σi,1) · ~f1
ri,1 · ~f2si,1 · ~f3ti,1 ,
~Cσi,2 = (1, 1, σi,2) · ~f1
ri,2 · ~f2si,2 · ~f3ti,2
to {(σi,1, σi,2)}ni=1. Next, generate a NIWI argument ~pii that e(σi,1, g) = e(HG(mi), σi,2).
This argument is
(pii,1, pii,2, pii,3) =
(
gri,1HG(mi)
−ri,2 , gsi,1HG(mi)−si,2 , gti,1HG(mi)−ti,2
)
7 This follows an observation by Naor and Teague [43] who used lexicographical ordering to make sure that the
representation does not depend on the order of insertions.
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and satisfies the equation
E
(
g, ~Cσi,1
)
= E
(
HG(mi), ~Cσi,2
) · E(pii,1, ~f1) · E(pii,2, ~f2) · E(pii,3, ~f3) . (1)
4. Finally, generate a NIWI proof ~pisum that X =
∏n
i=1 σi,2. This proof is
(pis,1, pis,2, pis,3) =
(
grX−
∑n
i=1 ri,2 , gsX−
∑n
i=1 si,2 , gtX−
∑n
i=1 ti,2
)
(2)
which satisfies E
(
g, ~CX ·
∏n
i=1
~C−1σi,2
)
= E
(
pis,1, ~f1
) · E(pis,2, ~f2) · E(pis,3, ~f3).
Return σ =
(
~CX , {~Cθj}`spsj=1, {~pisps,j}
vsps
j=1 , {(mi, ~Cσi,1 , ~Cσi,2 , ~pii)}ni=1, ~pisum
)
.
SignDerive(pk, (σ,Msg),Msg′): given the original message Msg = {mi}ni=1, return ⊥ if Msg′ 6=
Msg ∪ {m′} for some m′ ∈ Σ. Otherwise, parse σ as above and do the following.
1. Choose ω′1, . . . , ω′n+1
R← Zp subject to the constraint
∑n+1
i=1 ω
′
i = 0. For each index i ∈
{1, . . . , n}, compute updated Groth-Sahai commitments ~C ′σi,1 = (1, 1, H(mi)ω
′
i) · ~Cσi,1 and
~C ′σi,2 = (1, 1, g
ω′i) · ~Cσi,2 . Observe that the argument ~pii = (pii,1, pii,2, pii,3) still satisfies the
equation E
(
g, ~C ′σi,1
)
= E
(
HG(mi), ~C
′
σi,2
) · E(pii,1, ~f1) · E(pii,2, ~f2) · E(pii,3, ~f3) as it only
depends on the randomness of commitments.
2. Set σn+1,1 = HG(m
′)ω
′
n+1 and σn+1,2 = g
ω′n+1 . Then, pick random rn+1,1, sn+1,1, tn+1,1
R← Zp,
rn+1,2, sn+1,2, tn+1,2
R← Zp and compute commitments
~C ′σn+1,1 = (1, 1, σn+1,1) · ~f1
rn+1,1 · ~f2sn+1,1 · ~f3tn+1,1
~C ′σn+1,2 = (1, 1, σn+1,2) · ~f1
rn+1,2 · ~f2sn+1,2 · ~f3tn+1,2
as well as a NIWI argument ~pin+1 showing that e(σn+1,1, g) = e(HG(m
′), σn+1,2), which is
obtained as(
grn+1,1 ·HG(m′)−rn+1,2 , gsn+1,1 ·HG(m′)−sn+1,2 , gtn+1,1 ·HG(m′)−tn+1,2
)
.
3. Update ~pisum = (pis,1, pis,2, pis,3) by computing
~pi′sum = (pi
′
s,1, pi
′
s,2, pi
′
s,3)
=
(
pis,1 · g−rn+1,2 , pis,2 · g−sn+1,2 , pis,3 · g−tn+1,2
)
.
Note that ~pi′sum is a valid proof that X =
∏n+1
i=1 σi,2 since ~pisum only depends on the
randomness of commitments ~CX , {~Cσi,2}ni=1, which have not been randomized at this point.
4. Re-randomize the commitments ~CX , {~C ′σi,1 , ~C ′σi,2}n+1i=1 , {~Cθj}
`sps
j=1 and the proofs {~pisps,j}
vsps
j=1 ,
{~pii}n+1i=1 , ~pi′sum. Let ~C ′′X , {~C ′′σi,1 , ~C ′′σi,2}n+1i=1 , {~C ′′θj}
`sps
j=1 and the proofs {~pi′′sps,j}
vsps
j=1 , {~pi′′i }n+1i=1 , ~pi′′sum
be the re-randomized commitment and proofs. Note that, in all of these commitments and
proofs, the underlying exponents have been updated.
Return σ′ =
(
~C ′′X , {~C ′′θj}
`sps
j=1, {~pi′′sps,j}
vsps
j=1 , {(mi, ~C ′′σi,1 , ~C ′′σi,2 , ~pi′′i )}n+1i=1 , ~pi′′sum
)
after having re-organized
the indexation of {(mi, ~C ′′σi,1 , ~C ′′σi,2 , ~pi′′i )}n+1i=1 according to the lexicographical order for {mi}n+1i=1 .
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Verify(pk,Msg, σ): given pk, and a message Msg = {mi}ni=1, where mi ∈ Σ for each i, parse σ as
above. Return 1 iff the following checks all succeed.
1. Return 0 if {~pisps,j}vspsj=1 are not valid proofs that committed group elements (X, {θj}
`sps
j=1)
satisfy the verification equations of the structure-preserving signature.
2. Return 0 if, there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that ~pii = (pii,1, pii,2, pii,3) does not satisfy (1).
3. Return 0 if ~pisum = (pis,1, pis,2, pis,3) is not a valid proof.
Note that message elements {mi}ni=1 can be omitted from the signature if the signature com-
ponents {(~Cσi,1 , ~Cσi,2 , ~pii)}ni=1 are organized according to the lexicographical order of {mi}ni=1.
As in [14], one can finalize the set and prevent any further insertions by adding a special message
of the form “finalize‖#Msg” to the current message Msg, where #Msg denotes the cardinality of
Msg. In this case, the verifier has to return 0 if Msg contains an element of the form “finalize‖x”,
where x 6= #Msg−1. We also note that, as in [14], multi-sets can be supported by merely appending
a nonce to each added message in order to ensure uniqueness.
The scheme is unconditionally completely context-hiding because, except {mi}ni=1 (which are
re-ordered to appear in lexicographical order at each derivation), signatures only consist of perfectly
hiding commitments and NIWI proofs. Moreover, in the WI setting, these are uniformly distributed
in the space of valid proofs (as stressed in [32][Section 10]). Since these proofs are also perfectly
randomizable at each derivation, the complete context-hiding property follows.
The unforgeability is proved under the DLIN assumption and the assumption that the underly-
ing SPS scheme is XRMA-secure. In one step, the proof of Theorem 1 relies on the programmability
of the Waters hash function [47].
The security proof assumes a theoretical upper bound nmax on the cardinality of sets to be
signed. However, we emphasize that this bound does not affect the efficiency of the scheme what-
soever. In particular, the public key size is independent of nmax and only depends on the security
parameter.
Theorem 1. The scheme is unforgeable assuming that the DLIN assumption holds in G and that
the structure-preserving signature is secure against extended random message attacks.
Proof. Since the scheme is completely context hiding, we can use a simplified definition where the
adversary only interacts with a signing oracle. The proof uses a sequence of games where, for each
i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, Si denotes the event that the adversary A wins in Gamei.
Game0: This game is the real game. We denote by S0 the event that the adversary A manages to
output a successful forgery. By definition, A’s advantage is Pr[S0].
Game1: We change the generation of the public key and choose f = (~f1, ~f2, ~f3) as a perfectly sound
Groth-Sahai CRS, for which even an unbounded adversary cannot prove false statements. More
precisely, the challenger B sets up ~f1 = (f1, 1, g), ~f2 = (1, f2, g) and ~f3 = ~f1ξ1 · ~f2ξ2 , with
f1 = g
φ1 and f2 = g
φ2 , for randomly chosen φ1, φ2, ξ1, ξ2
R← Zp. If this modification significantly
increases the adversary’s probability of success, we can build a distinguisher for the DLIN
assumption (specifically, the DLIN distinguisher outputs 1 if the adversary is successful and a
random bit otherwise). This implies that, under the DLIN assumption, this modification does
not significantly affect A’s behavior. We can thus write |Pr[S1]− Pr[S0]| ≤ AdvDLIN(B).
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Game2: In this game, we can explicitly use the discrete logarithms (φ1, φ2) = (logg(f1), logg(f2))
that were defined in Game1 since we are done with the DLIN assumption. When A outputs a
forgery σ?, the challenger B uses (φ1, φ2) to extract X? from the Groth-Sahai commitment ~C?X
contained in σ? (recall that, due to the modification introduced in Game1, ~C
?
X is a perfectly
binding commitment). We raise a failure event, called F2, and let the challenger B abort if the
extracted X? was never involved in any signing query. Clearly, any occurrence of F2 immediately
contradicts the extended random-message security of the SPS system as the adversary only gets
to see structure-preserving signatures on uniformly distributed group elements X. The reduction
is similar to that of [3, Theorem 3] and relies on the XRMA security of the underlying SPS
scheme for the same reason.8 We can thus write |Pr[S2]−Pr[S1]| ≤ Pr[F2] ≤ AdvXRMA-SPS(B).
In Game2, we will prove that, conditionally on ¬F2, event S2 can only occur with negligible
probability if the Diffie-Hellman assumption holds. Let (σ?,Msg? = {m?1, . . . ,m?n?}) denote A’s
forgery. If F2 does not occur, the group element X
?, which is extracted from the commitment
~C?X contained in σ
?, was used by B in some signing query. Letting j ∈ {1, . . . , q} denote the
index of that query Msgj = {mj,1, . . . ,mj,nj}, we know that that Msgj 6⊆ Msg? since A would
not be a successful forger otherwise. Consequently, there exists ` ∈ {1, . . . , nj} such that mj,` 6∈
Msg?. Assuming that signed messages Msg1, . . . ,Msgq are sets of cardinality at most nmax, Lemma
1 constructs an algorithm B′ breaking the Diffie-Hellman assumption with probability at least
Pr[S2|¬F2]/(16 · q · nmax · (L + 1)). The probability of event S2|¬F2 can thus be bounded by
Pr[S2|¬F2] ≤ 16 · q · nmax · (L+ 1) ·AdvCDH(B′).
Since Pr[S2] = Pr[S2 ∧ F2] + Pr[S2 ∧ ¬F2] ≤ Pr[F2] + Pr[S2|¬F2], we find
Pr[S0] ≤ AdvDLIN(B) + 2 ·AdvRMA-SPS(B) + 16 · q · nmax · (L+ 1) ·AdvCDH(B′)
which proves the announced result. uunionsq
The programmability properties of the Waters hash function are used in the proof of Lemma
1. In a nutshell, the reduction will have to guess upfront which one-time public key Xj? will
be recycled in the adversary’s forgery among those involved in responses to signing queries. When
answering this signing query, the reduction will implicitly use the ga part of its given Diffie-Hellman
instance (g, ga, gb) to form the one-time public key Xj? . In addition, if the input of the j
?-th signing
query is Msgj? = {mj?,i}nj?i=1, we know that at least one element of Msgj? will be outside the set
Msg? = {m?i }n
?
i=1 chosen by the adversary for its forgery. If we denote by mj?,` an arbitrary message
in Msgj?\Msg?, the reduction will be successful if HG(mj?,`) = gamj?,` , for some known amj?,` ∈ Zp,
and HG(m
?
i ) = g
am?
i · (gb)bm?i with bm?i 6= 0 for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n?}. The results of [47, 33] guarantee
that these conditions are met with non-negligible probability.
Lemma 1. In Game2, if event S2|¬F2 occurs with noticeable probability then there exists an al-
gorithm B′ solving the CDH problem with probability at least AdvCDH(B′) ≥ Pr[S2|¬F2]/(16 · q ·
nmax · (L+ 1)), where nmax is the maximal cardinality of signed subsets.
Proof. Algorithm B′ takes as input (g, ga, gb) and aims at computing gab using its interaction with
the adversary in Game2.
8 In short, for each message X for which the XRMA challenger generates a signature, the reduction needs x = logg(X)
to properly run Step 3 of the signing algorithm.
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To this end, B′ begins by choosing (h0, h1, . . . , hL) ∈ GL+1 as in the security proof of Waters
signatures [47]. Namely, for any string m ∈ {0, 1}L, the hash value HG(m) = h0 ·
∏L
i=1 h
m[i]
i can be
written as HG(m) = (g
b)J(m) · gK(m) for certain integer-valued functions J,K : {0, 1}L → Zp that
remain internal to the simulation. In the terminology of programmable hash functions [33], HG
will have to be (1, 2nmax − 1)-programmable with non-negligible probability δ. Concretely, using
the technique of [47], the functions J and K are chosen so that, for any pairwise distinct inputs
m,m1, . . . ,m2nmax−1, we have J(m) = 0 mod p and J(mi) 6= 0 mod p for each i ∈ {1, . . . , 2nmax−1}
with non-negligible probability δ = 1/(16 · nmax · (L+ 1)).
Algorithm B′ begins by drawing j? R← {1, . . . , q} and starts interacting with the forger A.
Signing queries: For j ∈ {1, . . . , q}, we let Msgj = {mj,1, . . . ,mj,nj}, with nj ≤ nmax, be the j-th
signing query made by A. These queries are handled by considering two cases:
– If j 6= j?, B′ chooses a fresh xj R← Zp, computes Xj = gxj and answers the query by
generating ω1, . . . , ωnj
R← Zp such that
∑nj
i=1 ωi = xj . This allows answering the query
faithfully, by generating commitments and proofs according to the specification of the signing
algorithm.
– If j = j?, B′ implicitly defines Xj? = ga. At this point, B′ considers each message mj?,i ∈
Msgj? and evaluates J(mj?,i) for each i ∈ {1, . . . , nj?}. If J(mj?,i) 6= 0 for all i, B′ halts
and declares failure. It also aborts if Msgj? contains more than one message mj?,i such that
J(mj?,i) = 0. (A lower bound on the probability for B′ not to abort will be determined later
on). Otherwise, there exists a unique index ` ∈ {1, . . . , nj?} such that J(mj?,`) = 0. In this
case, we have HG(mj?,`) = g
K(mj?,`), so that B′ can pick ω1, . . . , ω`−1, ω`+1, . . . , ωnj?
R← Zp
and set
σi,1 = HG(mi)
ωi σi,2 =g
ωi for i ∈ {1, . . . , nj?}\{`} ,
as well as
σ`,1 =
(
(ga) · g−
∑nj?
i=1,i 6=` ωi
)K(mj?,`) σ`,2 = (ga) · g−∑nj?i=1,i 6=` ωi .
Note that {(σi,1, σi,2)}nj?i=1 have the correct distribution as they implicitly share a = logg(Xj?)
in the exponent. Next, B′ generates commitments and NIWI proofs as in the real signing
algorithm.
Forgery: When A terminates, it outputs a set Msg? = {m?i }n
?
i=1 with a valid signature
σ? =
(
~C?X , {~C?θj}
`sps
j=1, {~pi?sps,j}
vsps
j=1 , {(m?i , ~C?σi,1 , ~C?σi,2 , ~pi?i )}n
?
i=1, ~pi
?
sum
)
.
At this point, B′ uses the extraction trapdoor (φ1, φ2) = (logg(f1), logg(f2)) of the commitment
to obtain X? and {σ?i,1, σ?i,2}n
?
i=1 from
~C?X and {C?σi,1 , C?σi,2}n
?
i=1, respectively. If one of the following
events occurs, B′ aborts and declares failure:
E.1 X? 6= ga: This is the event that B′ fails to correctly predict which one-time public key Xj would
be re-used in A’s forgery among those involved in signing queries.
E.2 mj?,` ∈ Msg?.
E.3 There exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n?} such that J(m?i ) = 0.
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If none of these events occurs, the perfect soundness of the proof ~pi?sum guarantees that B′ can
compute
gab =
n?∏
i=1
( σ?i,1
σ?i,2
K(m?i )
) 1
J(m?
i
)
.
We are thus left with assessing the probability for B′ to avoid the failure state during the game.
Since the choice of j? is independent of A’s view, we do have X? = ga with probability at
least Pr[¬E1] ≥ 1/q. Regarding E2 and E3, since Msgj? 6⊆ Msg?, we know that there exists k ∈
{1, . . . , nj?} such that mj?,k ∈ Msgj?\Msg?. If we define the set Msg = (Msgj? ∪Msg?)\{mj?,k}, a
sufficient condition for the desirable event ¬E2 ∧ ¬E3 to come about is to have
J(mj?,k) = 0 and J(m) 6= 0 ∀m ∈ Msg . (3)
Since the cardinality of Msg is at most 2nmax − 1, the results of [47, 33] imply that condition (3)
is satisfied with probability at least 1/(16 · nmax · (L+ 1)). A lower bound on the probability that
¬E2∧¬E3 and that B′ does not abort at the j?-th signing query is thus given by 1/(16·nmax·(L+1)).
Taking into account the probability Pr[¬E1] ≥ 1/q, it comes that B′ never aborts with probability
at least 1/(16 · q · nmax · (L+ 1)). uunionsq
For the time being, the most efficient XRMA-secure structure-preserving signature based on
simple assumptions is the construction of Abe et al. [4], where signatures consist of 8 group elements
and the verifier has to compute one quadratic equation and three linear equations. Also, each one-
time public key X ∈ G must be encoded as a triple (gx, gx1 , gx2 ), for public elements (g1, g2) ∈ G2
and where x = logg(X). Hence, the commitment ~CX must come along with two other similar
commitments. If the SPS scheme of [4] is plugged into our HH-AOS construction, a set {mi}ni=1
of cardinality n can be signed using 9n + 54 group elements under the DLIN assumption (which
implies the CDH assumption). Then, the bit-size of the signature amounts to 4608 · n + 27648 if
each element of G has a 512-bit representation. In comparison with [14], our scheme only inflates
signatures by a constant factor.
In Section 4 and Appendix E, we discuss further implications of the above result to the setting
of ring signatures and ordinary (i.e., history-preserving) append-only signatures, where it implies
constructions for arbitrarily long rings or sets.
4 Generic Identity-Based Ring Signatures
An identity-based ring signature is a tuple of efficient algorithms (Setup,Keygen, Sign,Verify) with
the following syntax.
Setup is a randomized algorithm that takes as input a security parameter λ ∈ N and outputs
a master key pair (msk,mpk). Keygen is a possibly randomized algorithm that takes as input
an identity id and returns a private key did. Algorithm Sign takes as input a list of identities
R = {id1, . . . , idr}, a private key did for an identity such that id ∈ R and a message M to output a
signature σ ← Sign(mpk, did,R,M). Algorithm Verify inputs mpk, a message M , a list of identities
R = {id1, . . . , idr} and a signature σ. It outputs 1 if σ is deemed valid for the message M and the
ring R and 0 otherwise.
Identity-based ring signatures should satisfy two notions called unforgeability and anonymity,
which can be formalized as below.
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Bellare, Namprempre, and Neven [10] showed how to construct identity-based signatures from
any signatures. Galindo, Herranz, and Kiltz [26] extended the generic construction of [10] to several
kinds of identity-based signatures with special properties but their results do not carry over to the
ring signature case. Boneh and Hamburg [18] gave a generic way to build short identity-based ring
signatures from their spatial encryption primitive. However, their instantiations require to choose
a maximal ring size when the system is set up. It thus remains interesting to provide a generic
construction allowing for full security and rings of arbitrary size.
Unforgeability. This notion is formalized by a game where the challenger generates a master
key pair (mpk,msk), where mpk is given to the adversary. Throughout the game, the adversary
A is allowed to make private key queries: it chooses an identity id and obtains a private key
did ← Keygen(msk, id). The adversary is also granted access to a signing oracle: at each query, it
chooses a triple (id,M,R) and the challenger returns⊥ if id 6∈ R and σ ← Sign(did,M,R) otherwise.
Eventually, the adversary outputs a triple (σ?,M?, R?) and wins if: (i) Verify(mpk,M?, R?, σ?) = 1;
(ii) A did not invoke the signing oracle on a tuple (id,M?,R?) for any identity id ∈ R?; (iii)
No private key query was made for any id ∈ R?. Note that this model allows the adversary to
adaptively choose the ring R? of identities involved in the forgery. In the weaker model of selective-
ring security, the adversary would be forced to declare R? at the very beginning of the game, before
seeing mpk.
Full Anonymity. This property is defined via the following game. Initially, the challenger gener-
ates a pair (mpk,msk) and gives mpk and msk to the adversary A. The adversary chooses a message
M , a list of identities R = {id1, . . . , idr}, a pair of identities (id0, id1) and two private keys did0 ,
did1 . If {id0, id1} 6⊆ R or if did0 , did1 are not valid private keys for the identities id0 and id1, respec-
tively, the challenger returns ⊥. Otherwise, it challenger flips a fair coin d R← {0, 1} and returns
σ ← Sign(mpk, didd ,M,R). The adversary eventually outputs a bit d′ ∈ {0, 1} and wins if d′ = d.
As usual, the adversary’s advantage is measured by the distance Adv(A) := |Pr[d′ = d]− 1/2|.
The above definition of anonymity could be strengthened (as done in [7]) by allowing the
adversary to choose the random coins used by the challenger to generate (mpk,msk). Although
the generic construction hereunder does not guarantee anonymity in the sense of this stronger
definition, the specific instantiations obtained from our HH-AOS schemes can be proved secure in
that sense.
We also remark that the above definition allows the adversary to come up with private keys
did0 , did1 of its own in the challenge phase. The anonymity definition of [7] is different and rather
allows the adversary to choose the random coins used in the generation of did0 and did1 . However,
the definition of [7] still forces the challenger to generate did0 and did1 by running the legal key
generation algorithm. In this aspect, our definition is stronger since it allows the adversary to
choose any identity-based private keys did0 , did1 that satisfy the key sanity check (we assume w.l.o.g.
that valid private keys are recognizable) without necessarily being in the range of the private key
generation algorithm. It is easy to verify that the scheme of [7] does not provide unconditional
anonymity in the sense of the above definition. The reason is its use of groups G of composite order
N = p1p2p3 and the fact that signatures and private keys live in the subgroup of order p1: if an
unbounded adversary chooses did0 , did1 so that did0 does not have a component of order p2 but did1
does, this adversary can infer the challenger’s bit by testing if the signature σ has a component of
order p2.
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Our generic construction thus provides the first fully secure schemes allowing for rings of ar-
bitrary size while satisfying our definition of anonymity. Let Π = (Keygen,Sign,SignDerive,Verify)
be a completely context-hiding and unforgeable HH-AOS scheme. Using Π, we can generically
construct an identity-based ring signature as follows.
Setup(λ): run (sk, pk)← Π.Keygen(λ) and output (msk,mpk) = (sk, pk).
Keygen(msk, id): given msk = sk, compute and return did ← Π.Sign(sk, {0‖id}).
Sign(mpk, did,M,R): return ⊥ if id 6∈ R. Otherwise, encode R = {id1, . . . , idr} and the message
M as a set L = {0‖id1, . . . , 0‖idr, 1‖M‖R} of cardinality r + 1. Then, use did to compute
σ ← Π.SignDerive(pk, {(did, {0‖id})}, L), which is possible since L is a superset of the singleton
{0‖id} by construction.
Verify(mpk,M,R, σ): given mpk = pk, the ring of identities R = {id1, . . . , idr} and the message
M , define the set L = {0‖id1, . . . , 0‖idr, 1‖M‖R}. Return 1 if Π.Verify(pk, L, σ) = 1 and 0
otherwise.
Note that, in order to guarantee the unforgeability of the scheme, the ring of identities R must
be appended to the actual message in the last element of L. Otherwise, the adversary would be
able to introduce extra identities in the ring associated with any given signature.
Theorem 2. The above identity-based ring signature scheme provides unforgeability against adaptive-
ring attacks assuming that Π is an unforgeable HH-AOS. Moreover, it provides full anonymity
against unbounded adversaries if Π is a completely context hiding HH-AOS scheme.
Proof. The proof of unforgeability is straightforward as, given a ring signature forger, one can clearly
construct a forger against the underlying HH-AOS. We thus focus on the anonymity property.
The proof of anonymity is also immediate. We consider a first game, called Game0, which is
the actual attack game. We define Game1 to be identical to Game0 except that we modify the
way to compute the challenge signature in the challenge phase. Namely, instead of computing
the challenge signature as σ ← Π.SignDerive(pk, {(didd , idd)}, L), the challenger computes a new
signature σ ← Π.Sign(sk, L) on the set L. The complete context-hiding property guarantees that
A’s view will not be affected by this change since σ has exactly the same distribution in both
games. However, in Game1, the challenge signature σ does not depend on the adversary’s secret bit
d ∈R {0, 1}, which is thus independent of the adversary’s view. uunionsq
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A Groth-Sahai Proof Systems
In [32], Groth and Sahai described efficient non-interactive witness indistinguishable (NIWI) proof
systems of which one instantiation relies on the DLIN assumption. This instantiation uses prime
order groups and a common reference string containing three vectors ~f1, ~f2, ~f3 ∈ G3, where ~f1 =
(f1, 1, g), ~f2 = (1, f2, g) for some f1, f2 ∈ G. To commit to a group element X ∈ G, the prover
chooses r, s, t
R← Z∗p and computes ~C = (1, 1, X)· ~f1
r · ~f2s · ~f3t. On a perfectly sound common reference
string, we have ~f3 = ~f1
ξ1 · ~f2ξ2 where ξ1, ξ2 ∈ Z∗p. Commitments ~C = (f r+ξ1t1 , fs+ξ2t2 , X ·gr+s+t(ξ1+ξ2))
are extractable as their distribution coincides with that of Boneh-Boyen-Shacham (BBS) ciphertexts
[16] and the committed X can be extracted using β1 = logg(f1), β2 = logg(f2). In the witness
indistinguishability (WI) setting, the vector ~f3 is chosen outside the span of (~f1, ~f2), so that ~C is a
perfectly hiding commitment. Under the DLIN assumption, the two kinds of CRS can be exchanged
for one another without the adversary noticing.
To convince the verifier that committed variables satisfy a set of relations, the prover com-
putes one commitment per variable and one proof element per equation. Such NIWI proofs can be
efficiently generated for pairing-product equations, which are relations of the type
n∏
i=1
e(Ai,Xi) ·
n∏
i=1
·
n∏
j=1
e(Xi,Xj)aij = tT , (4)
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for variables X1, . . . ,Xn ∈ G and constants tT ∈ GT , A1, . . . ,An ∈ G, aij ∈ Zp, for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
In pairing-product equations, proving a quadratic equation requires 9 group elements. Linear
equations (i.e., where aij = 0 for all i, j in Eq. (4)) are slightly more economical to prove as they
only cost 3 group elements each.
In [9], Belenkiy et al. showed that Groth-Sahai proofs are perfectly randomizable. Given com-
mitments {~CXi}ni=1 and a NIWI proof ~piPPE that committed {X}ni=1 satisfy (4), anyone can publicly
compute re-randomized commitments {~CX ′i }ni=1 and a re-randomized proof ~pi′PPE of the same state-
ment. Moreover, {~CX ′i }ni=1 and ~pi′PPE are distributed as freshly generated commitments and proof.
This property was used in, e.g., [23].
B Structure-Preserving Signatures
In many privacy-enhancing cryptographic protocols, it is convenient to have signature schemes
allowing to sign elements from the domain group G of a bilinear map without destroying their
algebraic structure (in particular, without hashing them first).
The first example of structure-preserving signature was proposed by Groth [31] (although the
“structure-preserving” terminology only appeared in [1, 2]) but, due to very large signatures, it
was more a feasibility result than a practical solution. Abe, Haralambiev and Ohkubo [1, 2] (AHO)
described a very efficient structure-preserving signature we remind the reader in this section.
The description below assumes public parameters pp =
(
(G,GT ), g
)
consisting of bilinear
groups (G,GT ) of prime order p > 2λ, where λ ∈ N and a generator g ∈ G.
Keygen(pp, n): given an upper bound n ∈ N on the number of group elements per signed message,
choose generators Gr, Hr
R← G. Pick γz, δz R← Zp and γi, δi R← Zp, for i = 1 to n. Then,
compute Gz = G
γz
r , Hz = H
δz
r and Gi = G
γi
r , Hi = H
δi
r for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Finally, choose
αa, αb
R← Zp and define A = e(Gr, gαa) and B = e(Hr, gαb). The public key is defined to be
pk =
(
Gr, Hr, Gz, Hz, {Gi, Hi}ni=1, A, B
) ∈ G2n+4 ×G2T
while the private key is sk =
(
αa, αb, γz, δz, {γi, δi}ni=1
)
.
Sign(sk, (M1, . . . ,Mn)): to sign a vector (M1, . . . ,Mn) ∈ Gn using sk, choose ζ, ρa, ρb, ωa, ωb R←
Zp and compute θ1 = gζ as well as
θ2 = g
ρa−γzζ ·
n∏
i=1
M−γii , θ3 = G
ωa
r , θ4 = g
(αa−ρa)/ωa ,
θ5 = g
ρb−δzζ ·
n∏
i=1
M−δii , θ6 = H
ωb
r , θ7 = g
(αb−ρb)/ωb .
The signature consists of σ = (θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4, θ5, θ6, θ7) ∈ G7.
Verify(pk, (M1, . . . ,Mn), σ): given σ = (θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4, θ5, θ6, θ7), return 1 iff
A = e(Gz, θ1) · e(Gr, θ2) · e(θ3, θ4) ·
n∏
i=1
e(Gi,Mi) ,
B = e(Hz, θ1) · e(Hr, θ5) · e(θ6, θ7) ·
n∏
i=1
e(Hi,Mi) .
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The scheme was proved [1, 2] existentially unforgeable under chosen-message attacks under the
q-SFP assumption, where q is the number of signing queries.
As showed in [1, 2], signature components {θi}7i=2 can be publicly randomized to obtain a
different signature {θ′i}7i=1 ← ReRand(pk, σ) on (M1, . . . ,Mn). After randomization, we have θ′1 = θ1
while {θ′i}7i=2 are uniformly distributed among the values (θ2, . . . , θ7) such that the equalities
e(Gr, θ
′
2) · e(θ′3, θ′4) = e(Gr, θ2) · e(θ3, θ4)
e(Hr, θ
′
5) · e(θ′6, θ′7) = e(Hr, θ5) · e(θ6, θ7)
hold. This re-randomization is performed by choosing %2, %5, µ, ν
R← Zp and computing
θ′2 = θ2 · θ%24 , θ′3 = (θ3 ·G−%2r )1/µ , θ′4 = θµ4 ,
θ′5 = θ5 · θ%57 , θ′6 = (θ6 ·H−%5r )1/ν , θ′7 = θν7 .
(5)
As a result, {θ′i}i∈{3,4,6,7} are statistically independent of the message and other signature compo-
nents. This implies that, in privacy-preserving protocols, re-randomized {θ′i}i∈{3,4,6,7} can be safely
given in the clear as long as (M1, . . . ,Mn) and {θ′i}i∈{1,2,5} are given in committed form.
C The BBW Construction
To our knowledge, the only known construction of subliminal-free HH-AOS is the second construc-
tion given by Bethencourt, Boneh and Waters [14], which builds on the aggregate signature of
Boneh, Gentry, Lynn and Shacham [20]. In the recent framework [5] of homomorphic signatures,
the scheme of [14] can be described as follows.
Keygen(λ): given a security parameter λ ∈ N, choose bilinear groups (G,GT ) of prime order
p > 2λ with a generator g
R← G. Choose a cryptographic hash function H : {0, 1} → G, which
is modeled as a random oracle in the security analysis. Choose α
R← Zp and define the private
key to be sk := gα and the public key consists of
pk :=
(
(G,GT ), g, e(g, g)α, H
)
.
Sign(sk,Msg): parse the private key as sk = gα and the message as Msg = {mi}ni=1, where
mi ∈ {0, 1}∗ for each i. If n = 0 (i.e., if Msg = ∅), return sk. Otherwise, do the following.
1. Choose r1, . . . , rn
R← Zp and compute
σ0 = g
α ·
n∏
i=1
H(mi)
ri , σi = g
ri ,
where the messages are indexed in random order.
2. Return the signature
σ =
(
σ0, {(mi, σi)}ni=1
)
. (6)
SignDerive(pk,Msg,Msg′): parse Msg as {mi}ni=1 and Msg′ as Msg′ = Msg ∪ {m′}, for some
m′ ∈ {0, 1}∗ (if Msg′ cannot be parsed like this, return ⊥). Then, parse σ as per (6). Otherwise,
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1. Choose r′1, . . . , r′n, r′
R← Zp and compute
σ′0 = σ0 ·
n∏
i=1
H(mi)
r′i , σ′i = σi · gr
′
i .
2. Choose r′n+1
R← Zp and compute
σ′′0 = σ
′
0 ·H(m′)r
′
, σ′′n+1 = g
r′ .
3. Return the derived signature
σ =
(
σ′′0 , {(mi, σi)}n+1i=1
)
, (7)
after having re-arranged the pairs {(mi, σi)}n+1i=1 so as to have {mi}n+1i=1 arranged in a pre-
determined lexicographical order.
Verify(pk,Msg, σ): given pk, a signature σ and a message Msg = {mi}ni=1, parse σ as in (6).
Return 1 if and only if
e(σ0, g) = e(g, g)
α ·
n∏
i=1
e(H(mi), σi) .
In [14], the above scheme was proved unforgeable under the Diffie-Hellman assumption in the
random oracle model [11].
Proving the security of the scheme in the standard model seems rather difficult as it seemingly
requires to eliminate the random oracle from the BLS and BGLS (aggregate) signatures [19, 20].
It is tempting to believe that the sequential aggregate signature of Lu et al. [39] can supersede
the BGLS aggregate signature so as to work in the standard model. One interesting property of the
scheme of [39] is that the verifier does not learn anything about the aggregation order. Therefore one
could a priori hope to solve the problem by having the SignDerive algorithm generate a new signer’s
public key to be included in the derived signature after having run the sequential aggregation
algorithm.
Unfortunately, the resulting HH-AOS is insecure because the sequential aggregate signature of
[39] is only secure in the known-secret-key model (i.e., the adversary cannot come up with public
keys of its own without also revealing the private key). In more details, the scheme of [39] uses
public keys of the form
pki =
(
e(g, g)αi , (hi,0, . . . , hi,L)
)
. (8)
If (σ1, σ2) = (g
∑n
i=1 αi ·∏ni=1(hi,0 ·∏Lj=1 hmi,ji,j )r, gr) denotes the aggregate-so-far signature on the
messages {mi = mi,1, . . . ,mi,L}ni=1 for public keys {pki}ni=1, the (n+ 1)-th signer can compute
(σ′1, σ
′
2) =
(
σ1 · σlogg(hn+1,0)+
∑L
j=1 logg(hn+1,j)·mn+1,j
2 , σ2
)
before re-randomizing (σ′1, σ′2). If we naively try to construct a HH-AOS using the latter scheme,
the following problem occurs. Suppose that the HH-AOS signer has a public key of the form (8) and
signs the singleton {m1 = m1,1 . . .m1,L} by generating a signature
(
gα1 · (h1,0 ·
∏L
j=1 h
m1,j
1,j )
r, gr
)
.
Then, the adversary can generate his “public key” as e(g, g)α2 = e(g, g)ω/e(g, g)α1 for a random
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ω ∈ Zp of his choice. Hence, using gα = gα1+α2 , the second signer can cheat and sign any arbitrary
set that does not contain the original message m1 = m1,1 . . .m1,L.
In order to eliminate the need for random oracles, one plausible approach is to use multi-linear
maps [27] in order to build aggregate signatures in the standard model [34, 35] via standard model
instantiations [25, 34] of BLS signatures [19]. For now, this would only come at the price of very
large keys.
D A More Efficient Scheme from the q-SFP Assumption
This section shows how to slightly improve the efficiency of the scheme using a different structure-
preserving signature, due to Abe, Haralambiev, and Ohkubo [1], which features randomizable sig-
natures (the description of this system is given in Appendix B). Thanks to the latter property,
certain signature components can be given in the clear in such a way that NIWI arguments are
only needed for linear pairing product equations.
Our second construction also relies on the q-SFP problem, the generic hardness of which was
demonstrated by Abe et al. [1].
Definition 11 ([1]). In a group G, the q-Simultaneous Flexible Pairing Problem (q-SFP)
is, given elements
(
gz, hz, gr, hr, a, a˜, b, b˜
) ∈ G8 as well as q tuples (zj , rj , sj , tj , uj , vj , wj) ∈ G7 such
that
e(a, a˜) = e(gz, zj) · e(gr, rj) · e(sj , tj) , e(b, b˜) = e(hz, zj) · e(hr, uj) · e(vj , wj) ,
to find a new tuple (z?, r?, s?, t?, u?, v?, w?) ∈ G7 satisfying the above equalities and such that
z? 6∈ {1G, z1, . . . , zq}.
At the expense of relying on the stronger q-SFP assumption, we thus shorten signatures by 29
group elements, which is really noticeable for small sets.
Note that this specific SPS scheme was proved existentially unforgeable under regular chosen-
message attacks. Under the q-SFP assumption, it thus satisfies a stronger security notion than
RMA security but we do not rely on this property here.
Keygen(λ):
1. Choose bilinear groups (G,GT ) or prime order p > 2λ with a generator g
R← G. Then,
generate a Groth-Sahai CRS f = (~f1, ~f2, ~f3) for the perfect witness indistinguishability
setting. Namely, choose ~f1 = (f1, 1, g), ~f2 = (1, f2, g), and ~f3 = ~f1
ξ1 · ~f2ξ2 · (1, 1, g)−1, with
f1, f2
R← G, ξ1, ξ2 R← Zp.
2. Generate a key pair (skaho, pkaho) for the AHO signature in order to sign messages consisting
of a single group element. This key pair are
pkaho =
(
Gr, Hr, Gz = G
γz
r , Hz = H
δz
r , G1 = G
γ1
r , H1 = H
δ1
r , A, B
)
and skaho =
(
αa, αb, γz, δz, γ1, δ1
)
.
3. Generate public parameters for a Waters hash function. Namely, choose a set of generators
(h0, h1, . . . , hL)
R← GL+1. These are used to define the function HG : {0, 1}L → G such that
any string m = m[1] . . .m[L] ∈ {0, 1}L is mapped to HG(m) = h0 ·
∏L
i=1 h
m[i]
i .
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The public key is defined to be pk :=
(
(G,GT ), g, f , pkaho, {hi}Li=0
)
and the private key is
sk = skaho. The public key defines Σ = {0, 1}L.
Sign(sk,Msg): on input of a message Msg = {mi}ni=1, where mi ∈ {0, 1}L for each i, and the
private key sk = skaho, do the following.
1. Generate a fresh one-time public key X = gx, with x
R← Zp. Generate a Groth-Sahai
commitment ~CX = (1, 1, X) · ~f1rX · ~f2sX · ~f3tX , with rX , sX , tX R← Zp.
2. Generate an AHO signature (θ1, . . . , θ7) ∈ G7 on the group element X ∈ G. Then, for each
j ∈ {1, 2, 5}, generate Groth-Sahai commitments ~Cθj = (1, 1, θj) · ~f1
rθj · ~f2sθj · ~f3tθj . Finally,
generate NIWI arguments ~piaho,1, ~piaho,2 ∈ G3 that committed variables (X, θ1, θ2, θ5) satisfy
A · e(θ3, θ4)−1 = e(Gz, θ1) · e(Gr, θ2) · e(G1, X)
B · e(θ6, θ7)−1 = e(Hz, θ1) · e(Hr, θ5) · e(H1, X)
. (9)
These proofs are obtained as
~piaho,1 =
(
G
−rθ1
z G
−rθ2
r G
−rX
1 , G
−sθ1
z G
−sθ2
r G
−sX
1 , G
−tθ1
z G
−tθ2
r G
−tX
1
)
,
~piaho,2 =
(
H
−rθ1
z H
−rθ5
r H
−rX
1 , H
−sθ1
z H
−sθ5
r H
−sX
1 , H
−tθ1
z H
−tθ5
r H
−tX
1
)
.
3. Choose ω1, . . . , ωn
R← Zp subject to the constraint
∑n
i=1 ωi = x. Then, for i = 1 to n,
compute
σi,1 = HG(mi)
ωi , σi,2 = g
ωi ,
where the messages are indexed in some pre-determined lexicographical order. Then, com-
pute commitments ~Cσi,1 = (1, 1, σi,1) · ~f1
ri,1 · ~f2si,1 · ~f3ti,1 , and ~Cσi,2 = (1, 1, σi,2) · ~f1
ri,2 · ~f2si,2 ·
~f3
ti,2
to {(σi,1, σi,2)}ni=1. Then, generate a NIWI argument ~pii that e(σi,1, g) = e(HG(mi), σi,2).
This argument is obtained as
~pii = (pii,1, pii,2, pii,3) =
(
gri,1 ·HG(mi)−ri,2 , gsi,1 ·HG(mi)−si,2 , gti,1 ·HG(mi)−ti,2
)
and satisfies
E
(
g, ~Cσi,1
)
= E
(
HG(mi), ~Cσi,2
) · E(pii,1, ~f1) · E(pii,2, ~f2) · E(pii,3, ~f3) . (10)
4. Finally, generate a NIWI proof ~pisum that X =
∏n
i=1 σi,2. This proof is obtained as
~pisum = (pis,1, pis,2, pis,3) =
(
grX−
∑n
i=1 ri,2 , gsX−
∑n
i=1 si,2 , gtX−
∑n
i=1 ti,2
)
which satisfies
E
(
g, ~CX ·
n∏
i=1
~C−1σi,2
)
= E
(
pis,1, ~f1
) · E(pis,2, ~f2) · E(pis,3, ~f3) . (11)
Return the signature
σ =
(
~CX , {~Cθj}j∈{1,2,5}, {θj}j∈{3,4,6,7}, ~piaho,1, ~piaho,2, {(mi, ~Cσi,1 , ~Cσi,2 , ~pii)}ni=1, ~pisum
)
. (12)
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SignDerive(pk, (σ,Msg),Msg′): given Msg = {mi}ni=1, return ⊥ if Msg′ 6= Msg ∪ {m′} for some
m′ ∈ Σ. Otherwise, parse σ as in (12) and do the following.
1. Re-randomize the commitment ~CX and the proofs ~piaho,1, ~piaho,2, ~pisum. Let ~C
′′
X , ~pi
′
aho,1, ~pi
′
aho,2
and ~pi′sum be the randomized commitment and proofs. Note that, in all of these commitments
and proofs, the underlying exponents (rX , sX , tX) have been updated.
2. Re-randomize {~Cθj}j∈{2,5} and {θj}j∈{3,4,6,7} by choosing ρ2, ρ5, µ, ν and computing
~C ′θ2 = ~Cθ2 · (1, 1, θρ24 ) , θ′3 =
(
θ3 ·G−ρ2r
)1/µ
, θ′4 = θ
µ
4 ,
~C ′θ5 = ~Cθ5 · (1, 1, θρ57 ) , θ′6 =
(
θ6 ·H−ρ5r
)1/ν
, θ′7 = θ
ν
7 .
Note that, although the committed values inside ~C ′θ2 ,
~C ′θ5 have been updated, pi
′
aho,1, pi
′
aho,2
are still valid arguments for the new committed values. Then, compute {~C ′′θj}j∈{1,2,5} by
re-randomizing9 the commitments ~Cθ1 , {~C ′θj}j∈{2,5} and the arguments pi′aho,1, pi′aho,2 again.
Let ~pi′′aho,1, ~pi
′′
aho,2 denote the re-randomized arguments.
3. Choose ω′1, . . . , ω′n+1
R← Zp subject to the constraint
∑n+1
i=1 ω
′
i = 0. For i = 1 to n, compute
~C ′σi,1 = (1, 1, H(mi)
ω′i) · ~Cσi,1 , ~C ′σi,2 = (1, 1, gω
′
i) · ~Cσi,2 .
Note that ~pii = (pii,1, pii,2, pii,3) still satisfies the equation
E
(
g, ~C ′σi,1
)
= E
(
HG(mi), ~C
′
σi,2
) · E(pii,1, ~f1) · E(pii,2, ~f2) · E(pii,3, ~f3) .
4. Set σn+1,1 = HG(m
′)ω
′
n+1 and σn+1,2 = g
ω′n+1 . Then, pick random rn+1,1, sn+1,1, tn+1,1
R← Zp,
rn+1,2, sn+1,2, tn+1,2
R← Zp and compute
~C ′σn+1,1 = (1, 1, σn+1,1) · ~f1
rn+1,1 · ~f2sn+1,1 · ~f3tn+1,1
~C ′σn+1,2 = (1, 1, σn+1,2) · ~f1
rn+1,2 · ~f2sn+1,2 · ~f3tn+1,2
as well as a NIWI argument
~pin+1 =
(
grn+1,1 ·HG(m′)−rn+1,2 , gsn+1,1 ·HG(m′)−sn+1,2 , gtn+1,1 ·HG(m′)−tn+1,2
)
for the equality e(σn+1,1, g) = e(HG(m
′), σn+1,2).
5. Update ~pi′sum = (pi′s,1, pi′s,2, pi′s,3) by computing
~pi′′sum = (pi
′′
s,1, pi
′′
s,2, pi
′′
s,3) =
(
pi′s,1 · g−rn+1,2 , pi′s,2 · g−sn+1,2 , pi′s,3 · g−tn+1,2
)
.
6. Finally, re-randomize the commitments {~C ′i,1, ~C ′i,2}n+1i=1 and the proofs {~pii}n+1i=1 , ~pi′′sum so as
to obtain {~C ′′i,1, ~C ′′i,2}n+1i=1 and {~pi′′i }n+1i=1 , ~pi′′′sum.
Return the derived signature
σ′ =
(
~C ′′X , {~C ′′θj}j∈{1,2,5}, {θj}j∈{3,4,6,7}, ~pi′′aho,1, ~pi′′aho,2, {(mi, ~C ′′σi,1 , ~C ′′σi,2 , ~pi′′i )}n+1i=1 , ~pi′′′sum
)
(13)
after having re-organized the indexation of {(mi, ~C ′′σi,1 , ~C ′′σi,2 , ~pi′′i )}n+1i=1 according to the pre-
determined lexicographical order for {mi}n+1i=1 .
9 This amounts to multiplying these commitments by commitments to the group element 1G.
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Verify(pk,Msg, σ): given pk, and a message Msg = {mi}ni=1, where mi ∈ Σ for each i, parse the
signature σ as in (12). Then, do the following.
1. Return 0 if ~piaho,1 = (pi1, pi2, pi3) and ~piaho,2 = (pi4, pi5, pi6) do not satisfy
(1GT , 1GT , A) · E
(
θ3, (1, 1, θ4)
)−1
= E(Gz, ~Cθ1) · E(Gr, ~Cθ2) · E(G1, ~CX) ·
3∏
j=1
E(pij , ~fj)
(1GT , 1GT , B) · E
(
θ6, (1, 1, θ7)
)−1
= E(Hz, ~Cθ1) · E(Hr, ~Cθ5) · E(H1, ~CX) ·
3∏
j=1
E(pij+3, ~fj) .
2. Return 0 if not all arguments {~pii = (pii,1, pii,2, pii,3)}ni=1 satisfy (10).
3. Return 0 if ~pisum = (pis,1, pis,2, pis,3) does not satisfy (11).
If the above checks were all successful, return 1.
In the above construction, we can sign sets Msg = {mi}ni=1 of cardinality n using 9n+ 25 group
elements. The security analysis is basically the same as in our first scheme. The sole difference is
that, while the latter can rely on a RMA-secure SPS system [4] that does not require any other
assumption than DLIN, the q-SFP assumption is needed here.
E Completely Context-Hiding AOS Schemes
An append-only signature (AOS) [37] is a tuple of algorithms (Setup, Sign,Append,Verify), where
Setup, Sign and Verify work in the usual way (except that messages consist of ordered tuples
here). As for Append, it takes as input the public key pk, an ordered tuple M = (m1, . . . ,mn),
a message m and a signature σ such that Verify(pk,M, σ) = 1. It outputs a signature σ′ such
that Verify(pk, (m1, . . . ,mn,m), σ
′) = 1. Note that algorithm Sign could be omitted from the above
syntax since messages can be signed by running Append on an empty tuple M = ∅ and viewing
the private key sk as a signature on the empty set (as done in [5]). We chose to retain Sign in the
syntax for convenience.
The security definition of [37] basically demands that it be infeasible to come up with a signature
on a tuple M? = (m?1, . . . ,m
?
n?) without having obtained a signature on a prefix of M
?.
Let Π = (Keygen,Sign, SignDerive,Verify) be a completely context-hiding and unforgeable HH-
AOS scheme. Using Π, we obtain a completely context-hiding ordinary AOS scheme using the
following simple construction.
Setup(λ): run (sk, pk)← Π.Keygen(λ) and output (sk, pk).
Sign(sk,M): In order to sign an ordered tuple M = (m1, . . . ,mn), encode M as a set L =
{(1,m1), . . . , (n,mn)} of cardinality n. Then, use sk to compute and output σ ← Π.Sign(sk, L).
Append(pk, σ,M,m): parseM as (m1, . . . ,mn) and encode it as a n-set L = {(1,m1), . . . , (n,mn)}
of cardinality n. Then, compute and output σ ← Π.SignDerive(pk, {(σ, L)}, (n+ 1,m)).
Verify(pk,M, σ): given pk, parse M as (m1, . . . ,mn), define the set L = {(1,m1), . . . , (n,mn)} of
cardinality n. Return 1 if Π.Verify(pk, L, σ) = 1 and 0 otherwise.
Note that, since we append to each individual message m its position in the ordered tuple M when
encoding it as a set L, the underlying HH-AOS scheme Π does not need to support multi-sets.
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Theorem 3. The above scheme is a completely context-hiding and unforgeable AOS system pro-
vided Π is as completely context-hiding and unforgeable HH-AOS scheme.
The proof of the above theorem is straightforward and omitted.
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